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CaseNo.20080351-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

Luke Zachary Baker,
Defendant/Respondent.

Reply Brief of Petitioner
I
ALLOWING OFFICERS TO EXERCISE UNQUESTIONED
COMMAND OF A TRAFFIC STOP STRIKES A REASONABLE
BALANCE BETWEEN OFFICER SAFETY AND PERSONAL LIBERTY
In Point I of his brief, defendant acknowledges that an officer may reasonably
detain passengers incident to an ordinary traffic stop of the driver. See Resp. Br. at 9
(citing Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (2007)). However, defendant asserts that
where, as here, the stop results in the driver's arrest, the officer may not continue to
detain passengers while the arrest is effected. According to defendant, continued
detention of passengers is justified only upon a showing of reasonable suspicion
that they are engaged in criminal activity, or that they may be armed and
dangerous. Resp. Br. at 9-10.

Defendant's argument ignores the settled and consistent teaching of the
United States Supreme Court that officers making a lawful detention or search may
'"routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation'" by detaining those
who may pose a danger to them while effecting the detention or search. Brendlin,
127 S.Ct. at 2407 (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997), in turn
quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,702-03 (1981)); accord State v. Wilkinson,
2008 UT App 395,111 n.4,616 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (recognizing Wilkinson "was in
fact detained for the duration of the traffic stop and that his detention was justified
by the need for officers to investigate [the driver's] traffic violations"); cf. Muehler v.
Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (holding Mena's detention for duration of warrantsupported search of premises she occupied with others "was, under Summers,
plainly permissible").1

1

Since of the filing of the State's opening brief, the court of appeals has
certified State v. Gettling, Case No. 20080037-SC, to this Court for determination. See
Order of Certification, dated 20 October 2008 (a copy is attached). Gettling similarly
raises the issue of how long a passenger seized incident to a traffic stop may
reasonably be detained. Because both Gettling and this case involve the same issue
they should be heard on the same oral argument calendar.

2

A. The State is applying settled Fourth Amendment law, not
proposing a new rule.
Notwithstanding the above, defendant disputes that the State is applying
settled Fourth Amendment law, repeatedly characterizing as a new rule the State's
assertion that officers may reasonably detain passengers incident to the driver's
arrest, including searching the passenger compartment. Resp. Br. at 6-7, 16.
Defendant particularly discounts the State's reliance on Summers because that case
involved a warrant-supported search and detention rather than a warrantless traffic
stop and arrest, as here. Resp. Br. at 14. However, the existence of the warrant was
not the only reason the Supreme Court upheld Summers' detention. It also upheld
Summers' detention because the execution of a search warrant is dangerous
business. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03. Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly
recognized that its holding in Summers "[did] not, of course, preclude the possibility
that comparable police conduct may be justified by exigent circumstances in the
absence of a warrant." Id. at 703 n.17. Indeed, the Supreme Court went on to
uphold "comparable police conduct" "in the absence of a warrant" in Wilson, a
passenger detention case.
In Wilson, the Supreme Court recognized that just as "'the execution of a
warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to

3

sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence/" 519 U.S. at 414
(quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-703), the "danger to an officer from a traffic stop is
likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the
stopped car/' Id. The Wilson Court observed that Summers thus "offerjed] guidance
by analogy/7 and reiterated Summers''teaching that "'[t]he risk of harm to both the
police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation/" Id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-703); see also
Brendlin, 127 S.Ct. at 2407 (quoting Wilson, in turn quoting Summers). The
reasonable inference from the Supreme Court's repeated reliance on Summers in
passenger detention cases such as Wilson and Brendlin is that "'the risk of harm to
both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command'" in executing both warrant-supported and warrantless
detentions or searches. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414; Brendlin, 127 S.Ct. at 2407. Indeed,
Brendlin specifically states that "[i]t i s . . . reasonable for passengers to expect that a
police officer at the scene ofa[nJ . . . arrest... will not let people move around in
ways that could jeopardize his safety." 127 S.Ct. at 2407 (emphasis added).
Additionally, where, as here, the initial traffic stop is lawful and officers
thereafter develop probable cause to arrest the driver, the continued detention of
passengers is reasonable—not arbitrary as defendant asserts. See Resp. Br. at 13.
4

Defendant's assertion ignores the fact that the Fourth Amendment is governed by
an objective, not subjective, standard. Officers cannot arbitrarily decide to arrest the
driver; any arrest must be supported by probable cause. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146,153 (2004). It necessarily follows that if officers cannot arbitrarily arrest the
driver, they cannot arbitrarily detain passengers incident to the driver's arrestPassengers are reasonably detained incident to the driver's arrest only when, as
here, the arrest is supported by probable cause.
Moreover, this Court recognized in State v. Hansen, that "[o]nce the purpose of
the initial stop is concluded,... the person must be allowed to depart," ''unless an
officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of & further illegality/' 2002 UT
125, f 31, 63 P.3d 650 (emphasis added). It reasonably follows that the officer
maintains "unquestioned command of the situation," to ensure his or her safety.
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (case citation and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the risk
to officer safety only increases once an arrest is initiated. See United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,234-35 (1973) (recognizing "danger to an officer is far greater
in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively
fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop"); accord Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113,117 (1998). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5

The increased potential for danger includes passengers. When officers
prepare to search a car incident to the driver's arrest, "the motivation of a passenger
to employ violence to prevent apprehension of... a crime is every bit as great as
that of the driver." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414; see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,
373 (2003) (noting passengers "will often be engaged in a common enterprise with
the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of
their wrongdoing" (case citation and quotation marks omitted)). Officer Robertson
immediately developed probable cause of "a further illegality" here when he
learned the driver's license was suspended for drugs. Hansen, 2002 UT125, f 31
(additional quotation marks omitted); see also R72.2 Thus, "further temporary
detention" of the passengers—incident to the driver's arrest—was justified by both
probable cause and weighty officer safety concerns. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31
(additional quotation marks omitted); see also Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35; Knowles,
525 U.S. at 117; Wilson, 419 U.S. at 414.

Although defendant repeatedly asserts that passengers will be detained
based on an officer's "arbitrary decision" to arrest the driver, he does not assert that
the driver's arrest in this case was arbitrary, or unsupported by probable cause.
Resp. Br. at 13; see also id. at 15-16.

6

B. The involvement of a K-9 unit caused no delay; but even assuming
arguendo some delay occurred here, it was de minimis.
Finally, defendant asserts that allowing officers to exercise unquestioned
command of a traffic stop will result in unreasonably prolonged detentions. See,
e.g., Resp. Br. at 13. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the State is not arguing that
officers may detain passengers indefinitely, but only until the lawful objectives of
the stop are completed. As explained in the State's opening brief, where, as here,
the driver is arrested on probable cause, the lawful objectives of the stop evolve as a
matter of law to include searching the passenger compartment. See Pet. Br. at 16-17
(citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981) and State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,
1203 (Utah 1995) (recognizing Belton authorizes officers to search arrested person
and "his or her vehicle")). And the continued detention of passengers incident to the
driver's arrest and ensuing search is justified, see Part A, supra, so long as it does not
involve unreasonable delay. See Pet. Br. at 15-26; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405,407 (2006) (holding suspicionless canine sniff during routine traffic stop was
reasonable where it did not prolong stop beyond time reasonably required to

7

complete it); Meuhler, 544 U-S. at 101 (applying Caballes and holding officers may ask
unrelated questions, so long as questions do not prolong the detention).3
Here, upon learning that the driver's license had been suspended for drugs,
Officer Robertson "called for a K-9 unit to check the vehicle for controlled
substances." Baker, 2008 UT App 115, \ 3,182 R3d 935. According to the court of
appeals, unreasonable delay occurred because there was "no lawful reason why the
passengers were detained while the officers awaited the arrival of the K-9 unit."
Baker, 2008 UT App 115,f12. Specifically, the court of appeals held that "the driver
was arrested well before the K-9 unit arrived," and that "placing [the defendant] in
the patrol car, which occurred only a minute before the K-9 unit was on the scene,
was, at best, a ministerial act." Id. Defendant asserts that the court of appeals'
holding can be read to support unreasonable delay of from ten to fifteen minutes.
Resp. Br. at 20 (citing Baker, 2008 UT App 115, Yl 3,12, 26). As will be shown,

3

Although defendant distinguishes Muehler because it concerned the
detention of a home's occupants while the premises were searched pursuant to a
warrant, see Resp. Br. at 15, courts have universally recognized that Muehler is
equally applicable to traffic stops. See, e.g., United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d
495,501 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505,510 (8th Cir.
2007); United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077,1080 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265,1269 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hernandez, 418 R3d
1206,1209 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Singh, 415 F.3d 288, 294 (2nd Cir.
2005); see also People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947,960-961 (111. 2008) (collecting cases).
8

however, the record does not support that any delay occurred, let alone
unreasonable delay.
For example, the trial court found that the driver was placed under formal
arrest before the K-9 unit arrived, but it also found that the "officers were dealing
with the driver and her arrest until the K-9 unit arrived/7 R72 (emphasis added).
The State argued that because defendant did not challenge the latter finding on
direct appeal, he was bound by it. See Aple. Br. at 17-18 (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82,13,100 P.3d 177 (holding trial court findings not properly challenged and
assuming evidence supported them, absent defendants failure to properly marshal
the evidence); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 12,164 P.3d 397 (accepting
trial court finding where Worwood "failed to actually challenge [the] finding by
marshalling the evidence"). Defendant also acknowledged that he was not
challenging the finding. See Reply Br. at 12 ("Baker does not challenge the fact that
the officers arrested the driver before the K-9 unit arrived and that the officers were

9

still 'dealing' with the driver after the K-9 unit arrived" (emphasis added)).4 The most
reasonable inference to be drawn from the trial court's imchallenged finding is that
the officers were not merely waiting for the K-9 unit to arrive, they were also
"dealing with the driver and her arrest." R72. The court of appeals' disregard of the
trial court's imchallenged finding was error. See Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 3; Worzvood,
2007 UT 47,112.
In any event, assuming arguendo, as did the court of appeals, that a delay of
approximately one minute occurred between the time the driver was placed in the
patrol car and the arrival of the K-9 unit, Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f 12, this slight
delay was de minimis and did not prolong the stop unreasonably. See Pet. Br. at 31
n.8 (collecting cases). Defendant mistakenly asserts that the court of appeals
opinion can be read to support delay of from ten to fifteen minutes. See Resp. Br. at
20 (citing Baker, 2008 UT App 115, \ \ 3,12,26). As noted, the court of appeals held
that "the driver was arrested well before the K-9 unit arrived/' and that "placing

4

Rather than challenge the trial court's finding, defendant asserted in the
court of appeals that "the trial court never found... that the arrest of the driver was
not complete until the passenger compartment was searched." Reply Br. at 12.
While true, defendant's statement is unhelpful. The trial court never found either
way. Although the trial court made no finding as to when the driver's arrest was
completed, it did find, as noted above, that the "officers were dealing with the
driver and her arrest until the K-9 arrived." R72 (emphasis added).
10

[the driver] in the patrol car, which occurred only a minute before the K-9 unit was
on the scene, was, at best, a ministerial act." Baker, 2008 UT App 115,f12. But the
questionable label "ministerial act" cannot obscure the fact that the act of placing the
driver in the patrol car was a step in the process of effecting the arrest—a step that
occurred approximately one minute prior to the K-9 unit's arrival. And neither the
court of appeals nor defendant deny that a delay of one minute is almost by
definition de minimis. Id.

n
AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE OFFICER WOULD HAVE BEEN
CONCERNED ABOUT SAFETY FROM THE MOMENT HE OR SHE
FIRST SAW A KNIFE ON A BACKSEAT PASSENGER
In Points U-UL of his brief, defendant disputes that the officers reasonably
suspected that he may have been armed and dangerous, or that he may have been
involved in criminal activity. See Resp. Br. at 19-24. As explained above, and in the
State's opening brief, officer safety concerns justify detaining passengers until the
business of the traffic stop is completed, including searching the passenger
compartment incident to the driver's arrest, even absent independent reasonable

11

suspicion. See Pet. at 15-26. Although the officers here did not need reasonable
suspicion to detain and frisk defendant, they had it. Id.5
The reasonableness of a detention or search is evaluated objectively,
according to the totality of the circumstances. See Pet. Br. at 33 (citing State v.
Warren, 2003 UT 36, 1 14,78 P.3d 590). The well-settled test is "whether 'the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate.'"
Warren, 2003 UT 36, 1 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citations omitted)). Here,
an objectively reasonable officer would have been concerned that the vehicle
occupants may be armed and dangerous from the moment he or she approached the
vehicle and saw a knife on one of the backseat passengers. See Pet. Br. at 26-31
(discussing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)). The objective reasonableness of
this concern only escalated as the stop progressed. Officer Robertson found a knife
5

Defendant specifically asserts in Point IT of his brief, that the court of appeals
made "factual finding[s] that the officers did not believe the passengers were armed
and dangerous," and "that [his] detention after the arrest of the driver lacked
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Resp. Br. at 19 (citing Baker,
2008 UT App 115,H13,17-18). Because the State does not "marshal the evidence in
support of the Court Appeals' decision," defendant asks the Court to "ignore the
State's [contrary] assertions for failing to comply with [Utah R. App. 24]." Resp. Br.
at 20-21 (citing Utah R. App. 24). Factual findings, however, are the prerogative of
the trial court, not the appellate court, and nothing in rule 24 suggests otherwise, let
alone that the marshaling requirement applies to an appellee who does not
challenge a trial court's findings.
12

on the driver when he arrested her, and backup officers Bartell and Rockwood took
twelve more knives from the passengers. See Pet. Br. at 8-9 (citing R70-69).
Additionally, the driver was arrested for driving on suspension for drugs, and a
drug dog alerted on the vehicle. Finally, the surrounding circumstances also
contributed to the objectively reasonable belief that the passengers may pose a risk
to the officers during the traffic stop: the hour was late, the area dark, and the four
officers variously at the scene were always outnumbered by the five vehicle
occupants.

See Pet. Br. at 29 (citing R71-69).

Given the totality of these

circumstances, from the very onset of the traffic stop, an objectively reasonable
officer would have been concerned that defendant and the other passengers were
potentially dangerous, and that concern remained objectively reasonable up to, and
including, the moment of the weapons frisks.
The mere fact that the passengers were cooperative did not alleviate the
objectively reasonable concern that they had not relinquished all of their weapons,
even if the passengers made such a claim, which here they did not. See Pet. Br. at 35
(citing State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160,111,47 P.3d 932 (officer not bound to accept
Bench's innocent explanation), and State v. McLean, 1999 UT App 114U, 1999 WL
33244734, *3 (officer "not required to take the word of the driver that the weapons
were unloaded, nor did he have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening move
13

before he checked the weapons to assure his own safety")); see also State v. Hughes,
2008 UT App 443U, 2008 WL 5097689, * 1 (recognizing that once Hughes yielded up
a mini wooden bat and a knife was found on her cohort, "the officer reasonably
suspected that other members of the trio may also possess additional weapons.
Thus, the officer was justified to inquire as to whether Hughes would consent to a
frisk for additional weapons"); accord State v. Reeves, 91 S.W.3d 97,101 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2002) (officer reasonably suspected Reeves had additional weapons after "two
knives had been removed from [his] pocket"); State v. Martin, 195 P.3d 716, 719
(Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (upholding frisk where Martin admitted he had a knife,
emphasizing officer's testimony "that, in his experience where there is one weapon
there are sometimes others"); State v. Kantowski, 455 N.E.2d 1379,1383 (HI. 1983)
(upholding frisk, observing "it would have been profoundly foolish for the officer
not to be concerned that a man carrying a 10-inch knife on a city street may have
other weapons").
Additionally, the drug dog alert added to the objectively reasonable suspicion
that defendant may be armed and dangerous. Although the exact amount of drugs
inside the vehicle was then unknown, "a [person] of reasonable caution," Warren,
2003 UT 36, 1 14 (case citation and quotation marks omitted), would have
reasonably suspected that the vehicle occupants were involved with illegal drugs
14

and that they therefore possessed the confiscated knives for nefarious, rather than
innocuous, purposes. See Pet. Br. at 37 (citing United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185,
1195 (10th Cir. 2004) (frisk permissible, as officer reasonably suspected defendant
"involved in drug dealing/7 a crime "typically associated with some sort of
weapon")); see also State v. Banda, 639 S.E.2d 36,40-41 (S.C. 2006) (upholding frisk
where officer reasonably believed drugs were present in vehicle, giving rise to
reasonable presumption weapons also present). Thus, the drug dog alert not only
added to reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially dangerous, but
additionally established reasonable suspicion that the driver's involvement with
drugs was ongoing, and may also include her passengers. See Pet. Br. at 36-37 (citing
Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373 (noting "that a car passenger... will often be engaged in a
common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the
fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing") (case citation and quotation marks
omitted). In sum, defendant's detention prior to the drug dog alert was justified by
an objectively reasonable suspicion that he may pose a threat to the officers, and his
detention after the drug dog alerted was additionally justified by reasonable
suspicion that he may also be involved in illegal drug activity.
Defendant contests the State's assertion that "'the officers reasonably deemed
it safer to keep the passengers under control inside the vehicle while waiting for the
15

K-9 unit, rather than to attempt to remove and frisk them' even as the K-9 unit
arrived and went to work." Resp. Br. at 18 (quoting Pet. Br. at 30). But this is an
eminently reasonable inference from the undisputed facts. The officers were
entitled to search the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest, and
wanted the assistance of a K-9 unit, which had not yet arrived. Because the three
officers then on the scene were out numbered by the five vehicle occupants, it only
made sense to keep the passengers corralled in the vehicle until the officers were
ready to search the passenger compartment.
Moreover, where, as here, the detention and frisks were supported by
reasonable suspicion, it is not for defendant, or the court of appeals, to second-guess
the timing of the frisks. See Pet. Br. at 29-30 (citing Smith v. Ft'eland, 954 F.2d 343,347
(6th Cir. 1992) (cautioning courts against "allow[ing] the theoretical, sanitized world
of [their] imagination to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen
face every day"); see also Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395, 1 9 (declining to
"micromanage the actions and decisions of police officers during traffic stops and
other detentions," and "to evaluate each traffic stop with a second-by-second
accounting of an officer's actions"); accord People v. Jackson, 948 P.2d 506,509 (Colo.
1997) (holding "delayed pat-down search... for weapons was justified... because

16

at the time of the frisk the officers possessed an objectively reasonable concern for
their safety").
Turning to the frisk itself, defendant disputes that the officers reasonably
suspected that he may be armed and dangerous. Defendant focuses on two of three
officers' testimony that they were not in subjective fear for their safety, despite
recovering the large number of knives, because the passengers7 behavior had been
non-threatening. See Resp. Br. at 19 (citing R149:21; R150:13, 22-23, 30-32). An
officer's subjective interpretation of the facts is "one of several possible articulable
facts a court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances." Warren, 2003
UT 36,121. It is not dispositive, however, nor should it be, as this case illustrates.
As explained, Officers Robertson and Bartell expressed no subjective concern about
the knives, but Officer Rockwood remained concerned about the large number of
knives taken from the vehicle occupants. See Pet. Br. at 38 (citing R150:21-23). For
the reasons stated above, Officer Rockwood's continuing concern was objectively
reasonable.
Finally, defendant suggests that any concern for officer safety here could have
been alleviated by releasing the passengers, but retaining their knives. See Resp. Br.
at 18. This suggestion, however, implicitly acknowledges that an objectively
reasonable officer would have been concerned about releasing and rearming the
17

passengers before the business of the stop was completed. And of course, no
reasonable person would have felt free to leave as long as the officers retained their
lawfully possessed property. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 5 5 , f 1 3 ,
998 P.2d 274 (holding Ray was detained when officer retained her identification).
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision.
Respectfully submitted 22 December 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

^h^ht^dh
DECKER

Assistant Attorney General
counsel for Petitioner
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State of Utah,
P l a i n t i f f and Appellee,

ORDER OF CERTIFICATION
Case No. 20080037-CA

v.

Bradford Dale Gettling,
Defendant and Appellant,

This case is before the court on the parties' stipulated
suggestion to certify the case "for immediate transfer to the
Supreme Court for determination." Utah R. App. P. 43(a). The
parties note the similarity of this case to State v. Baker, Case
No. 20080351-SC, currently in briefing. Based upon the
affirmative vote of at least four judges of the Utah Court of
Appeals,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal is certified for
immediate transfer to the Utah Supreme Court for determination.
Dated this J&^L day of October, 2008.

FOR THE COURT:

amela T. Greenwood,
Pamela
Presiding Judge
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